This study analyzes the criteria used to allocate stocks to specialist firms on the NYSE. Non-performance variables play a predominant role in the allocation process, with large specialist firms receiving the majority of new listings. Controlling for size, more-profitable and less-profitable listings tend to be equitably distributed across specialist firms and specialists are more likely to receive allocations if they have not received a recent allocation or have recently had stocks delisted. Preference is also given to specialist firms that already trade other stocks in the same industry or stocks of the same type (funds and non-U.S. securities). Changes to the Allocation Policy in 1997 appear to have resulted in a subset of specialist firms being repeatedly awarded allocations, while others are repeatedly denied allocations.
Introduction
Events such as rule changes by exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the emergence of Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) have focused critical attention on the structure of securities markets. Much of this attention relates to differences between the specialist system on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and trading systems on other markets.
1 Despite this focus, however, little is known about the composition of specialist portfolios or the process by which they are created. I address this issue by analyzing the criteria used in the NYSE's new-listing allocation process.
The basic structure of the current allocation process on the NYSE was established in 1976.
Throughout subsequent revisions, the objectives of the process have consistently included spreading reward and risk across specialist firms, rewarding specialist performance, and providing the best possible match between specialist unit and stock. In fact, the allocation process is the primary tool used by the NYSE to enforce specialist performance. For example, the NYSE's Allocation Policy (1998) states:
"Because specialists can expand their business only by increasing the number of their specialty stocks, allocation criteria and procedures and the performance evaluations on which they rely focus critical attention on customer service and ongoing improvement in the level of specialists' performance." Cao, Choe, and Hatheway (1997) and Corwin (1999) provide evidence of significant differences in performance across specialist firms. 2 If viewed as important by the NYSE, these performance differences should be reflected in subsequent allocation decisions. However, non-performance factors may also be considered. For example, large specialist firms with more resources may be more likely to apply for and/or receive allocations. The NYSE may also rely on a queuing system or may diversify or concentrate specialist portfolios with respect to industry and security type. The methodology used in this paper allows us to test the relative importance of these alternative criteria.
1 For a recent example, see "A Nation Challenged: The Exchange: Feeling Vulnerable At Heart of Wall St." (New York Times, October 12, 2001 ).
2 Both studies identify differences in execution costs across specialist firms and Corwin finds that the level of noise in security prices and the use of nonregulatory trading halts differ significantly across specialist firms. See Smidt (1971) and Barnea (1974) for early discussions of differences in specialist performance.
The results suggest that non-performance variables play a predominant role in the NYSE's allocation process, with large specialist firms receiving the majority of new listings. After controlling for size, I find that more-profitable and less-profitable listings tend to be equitably distributed across specialist firms, and that specialists are more likely to receive allocations if they have not received a recent allocation or have recently had some stocks delisted. These findings are consistent with the objective to spread reward and risk across specialist firms.
I also find that the NYSE tends to allocate stocks to specialist firms that already trade other stocks in the same industry and to allocate non-U.S. securities and investment funds to specialist firms that already trade a relatively high proportion of these securities. These findings may reflect the NYSE's objective to seek a match between specialist unit and stock. The results are also consistent with the informational advantages of trading related securities modeled in Strobl (2001) and the mitigation of intra-exchange competition described in Pirrong (1999) .
The results provide only weak evidence that specialist performance affects allocations. While I find significant differences across specialist firms in several performance measures, only price improvement is significantly related to allocation decisions. This finding is inconsistent with the importance placed on specialist performance in the NYSE's Allocation Policy and suggests that the allocation process may not serve as an effective tool for monitoring performance. 3 Alternatively, the lack of results may suggest that the NYSE considers performance measures other than those studied here.
In March of 1997, the NYSE changed its Allocation Policy giving listing firms the option to choose their specialist from a subset of units selected by the Allocation Committee. The increased role of listing firms after 1997 appears to have resulted in a subset of specialist firms being repeatedly awarded allocations, while others are consistently denied allocations. In addition, while industry concentration is an important factor prior to 1997, its effects are diminished after the policy change. This suggests that listing firms either do not consider industry characteristics, or prefer to be traded apart from related securities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the allocation process on the NYSE and related theories of market design. In Section 3, I describe the data, the sample of new listings, and the characteristics of specialist-firm portfolios. In Section 4, I outline the discrete-choice logit model for allocation decisions. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
Stock Allocation and Market Design

The NYSE's Allocation Policy
When a new security is going to be listed on the NYSE, the Exchange invites specialist firms to apply for the allocation. From among the applicants, a single specialist must then be selected based on the guidelines established in the Exchange's Allocation Policy and Procedures. Prior to 1997, the allocation decision was made solely by the Exchange's Allocation Committee. In March of 1997, however, the Allocation Policy was revised to give listing firms an additional option for selecting their specialist. Under this option, the listing firm chooses their specialist from among three to five specialist units selected by the committee.
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The selection of specialist units is based on the "professional judgment" of the Allocation Committee in applying several criteria. These include ratings on the Specialist Performance Evaluation Questionnaire (SPEQ), objective performance measures, and several non-performance factors. The SPEQ is filled out quarterly by floor brokers and includes questions that rate specialist firms on particular The allocation committee may also take into consideration various non-performance factors.
According to the allocation policy, for example, the committee may consider listing-company requests, previous allocations received, capital violations, and disciplinary actions against the firm. The committee may also consider the characteristics of the new listing relative to other stocks traded by the specialist firm. In the analysis to follow, I provide tests related to previous allocations, recent delistings, industry characteristics, non-U.S. and investment-fund listings, and listing profitability. Data on listing company requests and capital violations are not readily available.
I note that the sample includes allocations made under both the pre-1997 policy and the revised policy. Ideally, I would analyze separately the specialist firm's application decision, the Allocation Committee's selection decision, and the listing firm's selection decision. However, due to data limitations, I am not able to identify either the subset of specialist firms that apply for a listing or the subset of three to five specialist firms selected by the Allocation Committee (post 1997) . The criteria that I analyze should therefore be interpreted as reflecting the combined interests of the specialist, the Exchange, and the listing firm. To determine whether specialist firm application decisions affect the conclusions, I provide separate analysis for a subsample of large new listings. I do not expect the application decision to be a factor for these listings, since most specialist firms are likely to apply for these allocations. To determine whether increased listing-company input has a major impact on allocation decisions, I test for differences in allocation criteria before and after the 1997 policy change.
Specialist Portfolios and Optimal Market Design
While several studies analyze the potential benefits of the specialist system (e.g., Glosten (1989) , 5 Since the implementation of the NYSE's Near Neighbor program in 1995, measures such as spread, depth, and price continuity are evaluated relative to a set of up to 20 benchmark securities referred to as "near neighbors". These securities are similar (based Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) , and Leach and Madhavan (1993) ), the allocation of stocks to specialists has only recently attracted attention. My analysis is closely related to three recent studies. Gehrig and Jackson (1998) analyze bid-ask spreads in a market with indirect competition between specialists. In their model, increased monopoly power allows the specialist to set wider spreads.
However, the monopolist is also able to internalize cross-security demand effects when securities trade as complements. Given this tradeoff, Gehrig and Jackson show that diversified specialist portfolios (independent ownership) are optimal when securities trade as substitutes and concentrated specialist portfolios are optimal when securities trade as complements. They also show that whether stocks trade as substitutes or complements depends on both return correlations and trade correlations (initial endowments). For example, positively correlated stocks that trade in tandem (e.g., basket trading) may act as complements, while stocks that trade due to portfolio rebalancing may act as substitutes. As a special case, Gehrig and Jackson show that if stocks trade as substitutes within industry and complements across industry, it is best to have multiple specialists diversified across industries. In this case, specialists compete within industry, but adjust spreads downward for complementarities across industries. Strobl (2001) examines the optimal allocation of stocks to specialists in a model with adverse selection. This model incorporates the trade off between monopoly power and the increased information precision that results from trading highly correlated assets. Strobl finds that specialists always prefer portfolios of highly correlated assets. Investors also prefer this outcome if the benefits from indirect competition are weak and the informational advantage of the monopolist specialist is large, but prefer competing specialists as the correlation between stocks increases.
These models lead to several testable implications related to stock allocations. If we assume that stocks within industries trade as substitutes, Gehrig and Jackson's (1998) results suggest that specialist portfolios should be diversified with respect to industry in order to maximize indirect competition.
Similarly, non-U.S. securities and investment funds should be diversified across specialist firms if these on a statistical measure) to the given security with respect to price, non-block volume, float and daily price range (SEC (1995) ).
securities trade as substitutes. Strobl's (2001) model points to potentially different effects before and after 1997. Allocations prior to the policy change are likely to reflect primarily the interests of the specialist and the exchange (though the allocation committee may also consider investor interests).
During this period, Strobl's model suggests that specialist portfolios will be concentrated with respect to industry and security type. After the policy change, when issuing firms were given greater influence over the choice of their specialist, the model suggests that industry concentration will become less important.
Finally, Pirrong (1999) develops a model of financial exchange organization and shows, among other things, that exchanges offering a variety of products may restrict the trading rights of members to only certain classes of products. While this analysis may not apply directly to NYSE allocations, one possible interpretation is that the exchange will concentrate security types (e.g., industries, ADRs, funds)
with particular specialist firms rather than spreading them across specialists. In contrast to Strobl (2001) , this concentration is motivated by a desire to mitigate intra-exchange competition rather than to gain an informational advantage. Pirrong's results also point to a potential conflict between the exchange's motives and the social benefits from indirect competition described by Gehrig and Jackson (1999) . The footnotes to Table 2 describe mergers and acquisitions among NYSE specialist firms. Of the 14 events during the sample period, eleven involved existing specialist firms and three were acquisitions of existing units by new specialist firms. There was also one new specialist firm formed during the period and two specialist firms that split from joint accounts to form their own specialist units.
Data and Sample Characteristics
The Discrete Choice Model
In this section, I describe the discrete-choice logit model used to analyze the allocation process.
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Let i index new listings and j index specialist firms, where i=1,..,N and j=1,..,J. In this framework, the exchange will allocate each of N new listings to one of J specialist firms. Suppose that the net benefits of assigning listing i to specialist j can be expressed as:
where z ij includes specialist firm and listing security characteristics, and β ij is a vector of coefficients. If the exchange assigns security i to specialist firm j, we assume that U ij is the maximum value of U i across the J alternatives. If the disturbance terms are assumed to be independently distributed with an extremevalue (Gumbel) distribution, the discrete-choice model takes the following form:
where Pr(Y i = j) is the probability that listing i is allocated to specialist j. The explanatory variables are described below.
Specialist Performance
To examine the effects of specialist performance on allocation decisions, I incorporate measures of quoted and effective bid-ask spread, quoted depth, frequency of price improvement, time at the inside quotes, price continuity, average opening delay, and order-imbalance halt use. 7 Together, these performance measures reflect characteristics monitored by the exchange and factors of interest to investors and floor brokers. If good performance is rewarded through the allocation process, I expect depth, price improvement, time at the inside, and price continuity to be positively related to future allocations, and spreads, opening delays, and halt frequency to be negatively related to future allocations.
Both quoted bid-ask spread and quoted depth are measured as a time-weighted average across all quotes posted during the day. The quoted spread reflects the cost of a round-trip transaction assuming trades take place at the quotes. Quoted depth, defined as the sum of bid and ask depth, reflects liquidity provided by the specialist and other market participants. I define the frequency of price improvement as the proportion of NYSE trades executed inside the best available quotes. The effective spread is then defined as the average of 2*|Price-Midpoint| across all trades during the day. This measure reflects transaction costs after accounting for price-improved trades. 8 I define time at the inside as the proportion of the trading day for which the specialist posts both the best bid and best ask across all markets.
Following the NYSE, I define price continuity as the proportion of NYSE trades that occur within $0.125 of the previous trade. Finally, I measure the total number of order-imbalance halts called by the specialist and the average opening delay, where opening delay is defined as the number of seconds from 9:30 a.m.
to the opening quote.
For each variable, I utilize the regression methodology of Corwin (1999) to calculate residual performance measures for each specialist firm. 9 These measures are updated quarterly and reflect 7 To be consistent with measures utilized by the NYSE, I report results based on dollar bid-ask spreads. Results based on percentage spreads are similar. I consider only order-imbalance halts because, unlike news halts, order-imbalance halts are initiated by the specialist (see Corwin (1999) ). Days that begin with a halt are excluded when calculating average opening delay.
8 Numerous researchers have documented a lag in the reporting of trades (see Lee and Ready (1991) ). Blume and Goldstein (1997) report a median lag of 16 seconds for NYSE trades during 1994 and 1995. To be consistent throughout, I account for this lag by matching each trade to the quotes posted 16 seconds prior to the trade time.
differences in performance that cannot be explained by security characteristics. 10 To test for statistical significance of performance differences across specialist firms, I create an empirical distribution for each test statistic each quarter based on Monte Carlo simulations with 500 replications. The regression methodology and Monte Carlo simulations are described in more detail in the appendix. the results are similar. However, for order-imbalance halt use, the χ 2 -test rejects too frequently the null hypothesis of no difference in performance. Significant differences in halt use are evident in 18 of 24 quarters based on a χ 2 -test, but in only six quarters based on the simulated distribution.
To determine the economic significance of performance differences, I compare the mean difference between the best and worst performing specialist firms to the overall sample mean. The results, reported in columns 1 and 2, suggest that differences in bid-ask spreads and price improvement are both economically and statistically significant. Across all stocks and all quarters, the mean quoted and effective spreads are 19.08 cents and 13.47 cents, respectively. After controlling for security characteristics, the mean difference in quoted spreads between the maximum and minimum specialist firms is 9.26 cents, or 48.5 percent of the sample mean. The mean difference in effective spreads is 3.23 cents, or 24.0 percent of the sample mean. The proportion of price improved trades averages 22.05 percent across the entire sample period, with a mean difference between the maximum and minimum specialist firms of 13.25 percent, or 60.1 percent of the sample mean.
The average opening delay also varies substantially across specialist firms, with a cross sectional mean of 207 seconds and a mean difference across specialists of 143 seconds. However, for even the maximum specialist firm, the average delay is less than 15 minutes and may not be regarded as important by the Exchange or market regulators. Similarly, while differences in price continuity and time at the inside are statistically significant, the economic importance of these differences may be limited; both variables average 90 percent or higher regardless of the specialist firm assigned to the stock. Finally, differences in halt use and quoted depth appear economically large, but are not statistically significant.
The reader may wonder whether alternative performance measures are compatible or whether there are tradeoffs between the various measures. 11 To address this issue, Table 4 reports correlations for the performance measures. Correlations are calculated quarterly and averaged across the 24 quarters during the sample period. The results provide little evidence of tradeoffs between performance measures.
The one notable substitution effect is that higher quoted spreads are associated with more frequent price improvement, while more frequent price improvement leads to lower effective spreads. The results also
show that lower quoted and effective spreads are associated with lower quoted depth, more time at the inside, and smaller trade-to-trade price moves (higher continuity).
Specialist Firm Size
Conversations with specialists suggest that size plays an important role in the allocation process, with large, prestigious listings being more likely to go to large specialist firms. This size effect may reflect a preference by the NYSE to allocate listings to large, well-capitalized specialist firms. Large specialist firms may also apply for more listings, since they are less likely to face resource constraints.
Given these arguments, I expect specialist-firm size to be positively related to the likelihood of receiving an allocation, especially for large listings. To test this hypothesis, I include in the model the aggregate market value of stocks traded by the specialist firm as of the listing date.
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As a first look at the relation between allocations and specialist-firm size, Table 5 lists allocation frequencies across specialist-firm size quartiles, where quartiles are defined by number of stocks traded.
New listings are categorized based on market value quartiles for all NYSE-listed firms as of December 31 st in the year prior to listing. In all listing-size categories, large specialists receive a significantly higher proportion of allocations than small specialists and this result is most pronounced for the largest listings.
For listings in the top quartile of NYSE firms, for example, large specialist firms received 50.0 percent of allocations, whereas small specialist firms received only 8.1 percent.
Queuing and Replacement Stocks
If multiple specialists are eligible based on other criteria, the Exchange may give consideration to specialists that have not received any recent allocations or that have recently had some of their stocks delisted. To test these hypotheses, I include two variables in the discrete-choice model. Queue is defined as the number of new listings that have occurred since the specialist last received an allocation.
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NDelist is defined as the number of stocks from the specialist's portfolio that delisted during the 12 months prior to the current listing. If securities are allocated based on a queuing system and to replace delisted stocks, Queue and NDelist will be positively related to the likelihood of receiving allocations.
Industry Characteristics
It could be argued that diversification of specialist portfolios reduces portfolio risk and increases competition. For example, Gehrig and Jackson (1998) suggest that allocating related securities across specialist portfolios results in indirect competition and reduces the specialist's monopoly power.
12 Complete data on specialist firm capitalization are not available. To test the validity of the size proxy, I estimate correlations between various size measures at the end of 1993 using voluntarily provided data from the Securities Industry Yearbook.
Capitalization data are available for six of the 40 specialist firms and number of employees is available for 17 firms. Based on these data, the correlation between the size proxy and specialist firm capital is 0.925 and the correlation with number of employees is 0.789. The results are similar if the number of stocks traded by a specialist firm is used as a proxy for size.
13 Initial values of Queue are defined based on new listings from 1992. For new specialist firms, the initial value of Queue is set equal to the maximum value of Queue across existing specialist firms.
Alternatively, one could argue that specializing in particular types of securities decreases the adverse selection problem of the specialist and reduces market-making costs (see Strobl (2001) ). Whether stocks are diversified or concentrated within specialist portfolios is therefore an empirical question.
To test whether the NYSE considers these factors, I define a measure of relative industry concentration. I first calculate the proportion of each specialist firm's portfolio and the proportion of all sample stocks that are in the same industry as the new listing, where proportions are based on aggregate capitalization. MktShr_Industry is then defined as the ratio of the specialist firm's proportion to the market-wide proportion and represents the relative concentration of a specialist's portfolio in the industry of the new listing.
14 If the NYSE allocates securities based on diversification (specialization), the coefficient on MktShr_Industry will be negative (positive).
Non-U.S. Securities and Investment Funds
Trading other types of securities, such as investment funds and non-U.S. securities, may also lead to security-specific expertise and/or indirect competition. For example, making a market in non-U.S.
stocks may require the specialist to build relationships with non-U.S. securities firms and to develop an understanding of international markets. Thus, the NYSE may allocate non-U.S. securities to specialist firms that have already developed this expertise. Alternatively, the NYSE may view these securities as indirect substitutes and diversify them across specialists to promote indirect competition. To examine these possibilities, I provide separate results for the subsamples of non-U.S. and investment-fund listings. on these variables will be positive.
More-Profitable and Less-Profitable Listings
One of the objectives of the Allocation Policy is to spread reward and risk throughout the specialist system. Sofianos (1995) examines specialist trading revenues and shows that in a sample of 200 stocks, the 60 most active stocks account for almost all trading revenues, while less active stocks actually result in trading losses. These results suggest that, in order to distribute reward and risk, the NYSE may choose to allocate large, actively-traded issues to specialist firms that trade relatively few large stocks and small, less-profitable listings to specialist firms that trade relatively few small stocks. 
Allocation Policy Changes
Revisions to the NYSE's Allocation Policy in March of 1997 gave listing firms a more significant role in the allocation decision. To examine the impact of this change, I create interaction terms by multiplying each explanatory variable by a dummy variable that equals one if the new listing occurred after the policy change and zero otherwise. While I cannot observe the actual decisions of listing firms, this analysis provides a test of whether the increased role of the listing firm significantly affects the relative importance of alternative allocation criteria.
15 I use market capitalization as a proxy for expected trading activity. While previous trading activity may provide a better proxy, this variable is not observable for the initial public offerings included in the sample. (or Likelihood Ratio Index). This measure is analogous to an R 2 from a standard regression and is equal to one minus the ratio of the computed log likelihood to the log likelihood for a model in which all slopes equal zero. The maximum pseudo-R 2 for the full sample tests is 4.0 percent and, for every specification, a χ 2 -test easily rejects the hypothesis that the independent variables have no explanatory power.
Results
All New Listings
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The coefficient on market capitalization is positive and significant in every specification. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the NYSE is more likely to allocate new listings to larger, better-capitalized specialist firms. Alternatively, this coefficient may reflect the fact that large specialist firms are more likely to apply for any new listing. These alternative explanations are examined further in Section B. The policy-change interaction term for market capitalization is positive but insignificant, suggesting that the policy change did not diminish the importance of specialist-firm size.
New allocations are also related to recent allocations and recent delistings. The delistings variable is positive and significant in all specifications and the policy-change interaction term for this variable is not significant. This suggests that, both before and after the policy change, listings were allocated as replacement for delisted stocks. The coefficient on the queuing variable is positive and significant prior to the policy change and negative and significant after. The pre-1997 coefficient 16 Although not shown, I also examined correlations among the explanatory variables. Large specialist firms tend to be concentrated in large rather than small stocks, have more delistings, and wait less time between allocations. Correlations among performance measures are discussed in Section 4.1 above.
suggests that new listings during this period were more likely to be allocated to specialist firms that had not received a recent allocation. One possible explanation for the post-1997 effect is that the increased role of listing firms in the allocation process resulted in a subset of specialist firms being consistently awarded allocations, while other specialist firms were repeatedly denied allocations.
After controlling for specialist-firm size, I find that specialist firms that trade a relatively high proportion of large (small) stocks are less (more) likely to receive any new listing. If listing size is related to trading profits, these results are consistent with the objective of spreading reward and risk across specialist firms. The effects of these variables do not appear to change significantly after 1997.
However, the coefficient on MktShr_Small is not significant when the interaction term is included.
The coefficient on industry market share is insignificant over the full sample period. However, the results in column eight show that industry concentration had a significantly positive effect prior to 1997 and this effect was reduced after the policy change. These results are consistent with Strobl (2001) and suggest that specialist firms and/or the allocation committee value the informational advantage of industry concentration, whereas listing firms either do not consider this factor or prefer to be traded apart from their competitors. Alternatively, these results may reflect a desire by exchange participants to mitigate intra-exchange competition, as in Pirrong (1999) , and a counteracting desire by issuing firms (post-1997) to increase indirect competition, as in Gehrig and Jackson (1998) .
Panel B of Table 6 lists results for specifications including specialist-firm performance. Each model includes the set of explanatory variables shown in column 8 of Panel A. The results for these variables are similar to those in Panel A and are not reported. I find only weak evidence of a reliable relation between previous-quarter specialist-firm performance and allocations. Of the variables that differ significantly across specialist firms, only frequency of price improvement is significantly related to subsequent allocations. Setting all other variables to their sample means, the coefficient on price improvement suggests that moving from the worst to best performing specialist firm at the end of 1998 would increase the likelihood of receiving an allocation from 2.65% to 3.55% (a 34% increase). In comparison, moving from the smallest to the largest specialist firm at the end of 1998 increases the likelihood of receiving an allocation from 1.07% to 6.02% (a 464% increase) and equal allocations across specialists would result in a likelihood of 3.03% (1/33). These results confirm the earlier finding that size is an important factor in the allocation process, while performance plays at most a limited role.
Large and Small Listings
To examine whether specialist firm application decisions affect the conclusions, I provide separate results for large and small new listings. Because most specialist firms are likely to apply for large listings, results for this subsample should be less affected by any potential selection bias. I define listing size relative to the median market capitalization across all NYSE-listed stocks on the December 31 st prior to the listing. Based on this categorization, the sample includes 536 large listings and 919 small listings. The results are reported in columns 1 through 4 of Table 7 . Results for performance measures are similar to those reported in Table 6 and are not shown.
The results for large listings are consistent with the full-sample results. I interpret this as evidence that application decisions and selection biases do not drive the results. In particular, the results confirm the finding that large listings are more likely to be allocated to large specialist firms. In addition, specialist firms are more likely to receive a large allocation if they trade a relatively small proportion of large stocks or have recently had a stock delisted. As in the full sample, the coefficient on Queue is significantly positive prior to the allocation policy change and significantly negative after, suggesting that queuing effects are either eliminated or counteracted by the decisions of listing firms.
The results for small listings are also consistent with those from the full sample, with two notable exceptions. First, the queuing variable is negative and insignificant prior to 1997. In contrast, to the full sample results, this finding suggests that small listings were not allocated based on a queuing system prior to 1997. Second, the large and small market share variables are not significant for small listings.
This result suggests that listing profitability is not an important determinant of small listing allocations.
Non-U.S. Security and Investment Fund Listings
Results for the subsamples of non-U.S. and investment-fund listings are listed in columns 5 through 10 of Table 7 . Again, the findings are generally consistent with those for the full sample. In both subsamples, allocations are more likely to go to large specialist firms and specialist firms that have recently had some of their stocks delisted. In addition, the large market-share variable is negative and significant for non-U.S. listings and the small market-share variable is positive and significant for investment-fund listings. The coefficient on Queue is insignificant for both subsamples prior to 1997, but is negative and significant for investment fund listings after the policy change.
The coefficients on MktShr_NonU.S. and MktShr_Fund are positive and significant in the non-U.S. and investment fund subsamples, respectively. These results suggest that either the NYSE is more likely to allocate non-U.S. stocks and investment funds to specialists that already trade a relatively high proportion of these securities or these specialist firms are more likely to apply for non-U.S. and investment-fund listings. Like the industry results discussed above, these findings suggest that the advantages of focused specialists outweigh any potential benefits from indirect competition.
Conclusion
Every security listed on the NYSE is allocated to a single specialist firm following guidelines in The results are generally consistent with the NYSE's objectives to spread reward and risk across specialist firms and to seek a match between specialist unit and stock. Although large specialist firms receiving the majority of new listings, I find that more-profitable and less-profitable listings tend to be equitably distributed across specialist firms, and specialists are more likely to receive allocations if they have not received a recent allocation or have recently had some stocks delisted. The NYSE also tends to allocate stocks to specialist firms that already trade other stocks in the same industry and to allocate non-U.S. securities and investment funds to specialist firms that already trade these securities.
I find only weak evidence that specialist firm performance affects allocations. This finding is inconsistent with the allocation process as an effective tool for monitoring performance. One potential explanation for this weak performance effect is that the NYSE may use alternative performance measures that have low correlations with the measures analyzed here. In particular, the NYSE's Allocation
Committee may place significant weight on SPEQ ratings assigned by floor brokers. The importance of SPEQ ratings in the allocation process and the correlation between SPEQ ratings and other performance measures provide interesting areas for future research. Unfortunately, data related to SPEQ ratings are currently unavailable.
While the Allocation Committee plays a central role in the allocation process, the role of listing firms was increased substantially in March of 1997. At that time, the NYSE implemented changes to its Allocation Policy giving listing firms the option to choose their specialist from a subset of units selected by the committee. This change has forced specialist firms to develop new skills and increase capital, since they must now market themselves in order to "win" allocations. My results suggest that the policy change has resulted in a subset of specialist firms being repeatedly awarded allocations, while others are repeatedly denied allocations. This competition for listings has been cited as one of the motivations for the substantial consolidation among NYSE specialist firms since 1997. I estimate residual performance measures for each specialist firm following Corwin (1999) .
These measures are calculated quarterly by regressing individual stock performance measures on a set of explanatory variables and specialist-firm dummy variables. 19 The explanatory variables are based on models of dealer pricing and price discreteness (e.g., Ho and Stoll (1981) , O'Hara and Oldfield (1986), Copeland and Galai (1983) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , and Harris (1994) Deviation is calculated based on daily closing midpoint-to-midpoint returns during the quarter. Fund is a dummy variable which equals one if the security is a closed-end fund, REIT or Unit, and zero otherwise.
18 Unlike other performance measures that are averaged across days, number of imbalance halts is defined based on the total number of halts called during the quarter. 19 To remove the effects of outliers, I exclude stocks with average quote midpoints less than $1.00 or greater than $500.00 and require stocks to have at least 10 days of trade and quote data during a quarter. In addition, securities involved in specialist-firm mergers are excluded from performance calculations during the quarter of the merger. See Hatch and Johnson (2002) for an analysis of the impact of specialist-firm mergers on market quality.
Non-U.S. is a dummy variable which equals one for non-U.S. securities and zero otherwise. I also include dummy variables to identify firms in the financial, utility, telecommunication, technology, and energy sectors, respectively, as defined by Fama and French (1997) . Spec j , j=1,..,J-1, are dummy variables which equal one if the stock is traded by specialist firm j and zero otherwise. To allow estimation, the dummy variable for specialist #3174 is excluded. A Poisson regression is estimated for the number of order imbalance halts. OLS regressions are estimated for all other performance measures.
To test for differences in performance across specialist firms, I perform an F-test (or χ 2 -test) of the hypothesis that all specialist firm dummy-variable coefficients are jointly equal to zero. I then perform a series of Monte Carlo simulations to create an empirical distribution for each test statistic each quarter. I randomly allocate stocks to specialist firms each quarter, subject to the constraint that the number of stocks allocated to each specialist firm is equal to the actual number of stocks traded by that firm. I then estimate the performance regressions and record the related test statistics. I repeat this process 500 times each quarter to create an empirical distribution and determine the associated p-value for each test statistic. 40.00 [11, 215] 47.00 [13, 220] 54.00 [14, 270] 55.00 [10, 272] 57.00 [8, 304] 60.00 [10, 293] 59.00 [20, 336] 
Pr(Y i =j) is the probability that new listing i is allocated to specialist firm j. The independent variables, z ij , include specialist firm and new listing characteristics defined as follows: MarketCap j is the aggregate market capitalization of stocks traded by the specialist firm at the time of the new listing. Market capitalizations for individual securities are updated as of December 31 each year. Queue j is the number of new listings that have occurred since the specialist firm last received an allocation. MktShr_Industry j is the proportion of specialist firm j's stocks in the same industry as the new listing divided by the proportion of sample stocks in that industry. MktShr_Small j is the proportion of specialist firm j's stocks in the smallest quartile of NYSE stocks relative to the proportion of sample stocks in that quartile. MktShr_Large j is the proportion of specialist firm j's stocks in the largest quartile of NYSE stocks relative to the proportion of sample stocks in that quartile. Proportions in the above calculations are based on the aggregate market capitalization of stocks. Residual performance measures are defined as in Table  3 . D Policy is a dummy variable equal to one if the listing occurred after the March 1997 change in the allocation policy and zero otherwise. Panel A lists results for specialist-firm portfolio characteristics. Panel B lists results for specialist-firm performance measures. The specifications in Panel B include the full set of variables from Panel A, though the coefficients are not shown. The pseudo-R 2 (or likelihood ratio index) equals one minus the ratio of the computed loglikelihood to the log-likelihood of a model in which all slopes equal zero. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table 7 -Subsample Analysis
The table lists coefficient estimates from a discrete-choice logit model of the allocation decision. Results for large and small listings are presented in columns 1-4, where listings are categorized as small (large) if their market capitalization is less than (greater than) the median market capitalization of NYSE-listed firms at the end of the year prior to the listing. Columns 5-7 list results for the sample of non-U.S. listings and columns 8-10 list results for investment fund listings. MarketCap j is the aggregate market capitalization of stocks traded by the specialist firm at the time of the new listing. Market capitalizations for individual securities are updated as of December 31 each year. Queue j is the number of new listings that have occurred since the specialist firm last received an allocation. MktShr_Industry j is the proportion of specialist firm j's stocks in the same industry as the new listing divided by the proportion of sample stocks in that industry. MktShr_Small j is the proportion of specialist firm j's stocks in the smallest quartile of NYSE stocks relative to the proportion of sample stocks in that quartile. MktShr_Large j is the proportion of specialist firm j's stocks in the largest quartile of sample stocks relative to the proportion of NYSE stocks in that quartile. MktShr_Non-U.S. j is the proportion of non-U.S. stocks in specialist firm j's portfolio divided by the proportion of non-U.S. stocks in the complete sample. MktShr_Fund is the proportion of investment funds (closed-end funds, REITs and units) in specialist firm j's portfolio divided by the proportion of investment funds in the complete sample. Proportions in the above calculations are based on the aggregate market capitalization of stocks. D Policy is a dummy variable equal to one if the listing occurred after the March 1997 change in the allocation policy and zero otherwise. The pseudo-R 2 (or likelihood ratio index) equals one minus the ratio of the computed loglikelihood to the log-likelihood of a model in which all slopes equal zero. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
